Arab-Israeli Conflict November 23, 2012 Leave a comment
Should Israel Engage Political Islam?
By Chadi Abou Daher, Ph.D.
Israel’s military operation in Gaza, Pillar of Defense, marks the first encounter of the Zionist state with the new dynamics of the Middle East in the age of “Arab Spring”. The Pillar of Defense operation was different from all previous military operations in Gaza in at least two respects. First, the operational milieu has considerably changed with Hamas being able to put over four million Israelis under the mercy of its upgraded arsenal. Second, the political milieu changed the context of diplomacy with the Muslim Brotherhood in control of Egypt. Irrespective of which party claim victory, the reality is that Israel’s operation has emboldened Political Islam. While Israelis are debating the achievement of the operation, Palestinians’ triumphalism has categorized the cease-fire in terms of a “Gaza Spring”.
In the aftermath of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza there are fundamental questions that touch not only on the durability of the cease-fire, but also go all the way to questioning Israel’s attitude to Political Islam. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood is the guarantor of the cease-fire understanding which provided Hamas and Islamic Jihad with a tacit recognition as de-facto players. Yet, this is far from being a reversal of Israel’s long held exclusion attitude toward Palestinian Islamic groups. In the wake of Hamas landslide victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections and its subsequent control of Gaza the following year, Israel vowed not to deal with Hamas politically. Israel’s disengagement policy allowed Hamas to consolidate its control over its Gaza stronghold which further radicalized its policies and increased the militarization of all Palestinian factions.
Israel’s military leaders have recognized from the onset of Pillar of Defense operation that there is no quick-fix solution to the problem of Hamas in Gaza. There are signs among the Israeli public that they are uncomfortable with the outcome of the operation. An on-going controversy in Israel question whether this operation has strengthened Israel’s deterrence capabilities or it just did the opposite.
The main take-away for Israeli policy makers from this latest round of hostilities is that the Hamas dominated Gaza is a problem that has grown bigger than being able to deal with through simple unilateral disengagement policy or military tactics. Hamas long range missiles, although limited in number, had major impacts on a wide proportion of Israeli public. It is most likely that this will aggravate the Israeli threat perception and endure the security approach that Israel has adopted in dealing with Hamas. In fact, the Israeli public has been socialized for generations with assumptions of strategic and existential threats which perpetuated a collective sense of victimhood and magnified the concern over security. This reinforced Israel’s one-dimensional exclusion policy toward the Palestinians and prevented the development of an Israeli conception of peace that is reciprocal and capable of reaching out to the other party. To the contrary, through the denial and oppression of its opponents, Israel’s threat perception became a self-fulfilling prophecy.
What Israel’s policy makers and public attitude should recognize today is the necessity of facing the reality of the conflict in order to unlock the vicious circle of hostilities and radicalization. An alternative policy direction for Israel would be to revive the political process and adopt an inclusion policy allowing Hamas and other groups to be part of it. The argument that Political Islam is doomed to radical policies is baseless. Egypt is the most recent illustration of how political Islam can become a responsible player once recognized as a legitimate player and engaged in political process.
To assume that Hamas non-recognition of Israel and its aggressive military stance are incompatible with such approach is a reversal of causality. Furthermore, the popularity of radical Islamic group in Palestine is the result of the failure of the political process to realize the Palestinian national aspiration in an independent and sovereign state. The failure of the peace process and the discrediting of Palestinian political leaders have empowered Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Today, there is a wide public consensus among Palestinians in Gaza that military resistance is the only viable path to statehood. The precedence that Hezbollah has established in Lebanon is becoming a powerful model of liberation.
Engaging Political Islam is the exit path out of this deadlock. Israel should recognize that the power of Political Islam is growing and gaining more legitimacy from moderate states like Turkey to conservative regimes like Iran. Political Islam should not be seen from the prism of security threat, but rather through that of political accommodation. In fact, Israel’s exaggerated perception of threat led to the formulation of national security objectives in purely military terms. Therefore, an upside-down reconsideration of Israel’s threat perception from a security approach toward a political one is a prerequisite for successfully engaging Political Islam.
Moreover, adopting a policy of engaging Political Islam depends on a powerful Israeli leadership that is capable of advancing a vision of peace that is inclusive and reciprocal. In a meaningful mythical analogy, late Pope John Paul considered that there are two possible peaceful solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict; a realistic and a miraculous. The realistic would be to rely on a divine intervention; while the miraculous would be to expect a voluntary agreement between the parties. Would Israel’s engagement of Political Islam become such miraculous solution?
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