Saturday, January 30, 2016

Lucky February 2016 ...

Feb 2016
This coming February-2016 cannot come in your life time again. Because This year February has:

4 sundays,  
4 mondays, 
4 Tuesdays, 
4 Wednesdays,
4 Thursdays,  
4 Fridays & 
4 Saturdays.  
 
This happens once every 823 years.

ISW INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY: January 22- 29, 2016 Reviewing the Week...


Reviewing the Week: 
ISW Intelligence Summary
January 22 - 29, 2016
ISW will continue to provide updates on all of these issues at www.understandingwar.org.
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ISW INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY: January 22- 29, 2016
Reviewing the Week
Compiled by Christopher Kozak
 
This report is derived from open sources collected and processed at ISW during the reporting period. The report includes analysis on Russia, Syria, Iraq, ISIS, Afghanistan, and Ukraine.
* Links may not work on mobile devices or some email platforms.

Key Take-Away

Pentagon recommends further expansion of global anti-ISIS campaign. The U.S. Department of Defense reportedly advised President Barack Obama that hundreds of additional advisors, trainers, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel will be required to combat ISIS in Iraq and Syria over coming months. One anonymous official stated that the proposed expansion could increase the number of U.S. personnel in both countries to approximately 4,500 soldiers from the current total of 3,700 troops. The recommendation comes after U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter called last week for coalition allies to increase their military contributions to the anti-ISIS campaign as part of a new concept of operations to seize the ISIS-held cities of Mosul and ar-Raqqa. Meanwhile, Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook confirmed that a "small group" of U.S. military personnel had made contact with local forces in Libya in order to identify potential partners for the anti-ISIS campaign. ISIS fields an estimated 5,000 fighters in its safe haven in Central Libya. The burgeoning requirements of the campaign to degrade and defeat the "parent tumor" of ISIS in Iraq and Syria as well as the "metastasis" of its affiliates across the region will require deepening military commitments from the U.S. and its allies over coming months.

Political instability challenges U.S.-led efforts to target ISIS safe havens in the Middle East, North Africa, and Afghanistan. UN-sponsored negotiations to end the Syrian Civil War faltered as the main Saudi-backed opposition delegation refused to attend talks starting on January 29 until the implementation of confidence-building measures by the regime and its allies. An UN-mediated effort to defuse the Libyan Civil War also faced new challenges after the internationally-recognized parliament voted against part of an agreement on a unity government on January 27. These diplomatic setbacks threaten to prolong ongoing conflicts that provide ISIS with safe havens in both countries. Meanwhile, crucial U.S. partners experienced internal political tensions that limit their effectiveness in the fight against ISIS. Tunisia restored order after widespread protests against the sitting government. Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi faces increasing pressure as his reform agenda slows under the financial and security challenges facing Iraq. The Kurdistan Regional Government in Northern Iraq convened new talks meant to resolve a long-standing dispute over the status of the regional presidency amidst a budgetary crisis driven in part by falling oil prices. The structural issues behind this financial shortfall will pose a long-term challenge that could undermine efforts to recruit, train, and retain fighters for the anti-ISIS campaign in Iraq. Meanwhile, prominent powerbrokers in Northern Afghanistan began distancing themselves from the National Unity Government as opposition groups gain political momentum. The unity government already struggles to maintain security and contest ISIS safe havens along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The U.S. will remain unable to defeat ISIS without a reliable means of securing its regional safe havens across the Middle East and North Africa.
RussiaMiddleEastRussia in the Middle East
By: Genevieve Casagrande

Russia enables major regime victories against the Syrian armed opposition in order to shape conditions on the ground ahead of international negotiations. Pro-regime forces seized one of the last remaining opposition-held strongholds in Northern Latakia Province near the Turkish border on January 24 as part of an ongoing effort to buffer the Syrian Coast. The successful clearing operations included heavy support from Russian military advisors and airstrikes. The regime's consolidation of the Syrian Coast applies considerable pressure on neighboring opposition-held Idlib Province, increasing calls for opposition unity and exacerbating tensions between key powerbrokers such as Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and Salafi-jihadist group Ahrar al-Sham. Pro-regime forces supported by Russian aircraft similarly seized the town of Sheikh Miskin along the supply route connecting Damascus to Dera'a City on January 25. The seizure of the town follows weeks of clashes with armed opposition groups inside the city that began in late December 2015. Russia also aided regime forces in attempts to shape the situation on the ground in Damascus prior to the start of international negotiations. Regime forces continued efforts to tighten the siege on the opposition-held suburb of Darayya following reports that Russia had rejected a potential deployment to the nearby Mezzeh Military Airport due to security concerns. Russia retains the option to expand its presence at the airbase in the future. The Mezzeh District also remains an area of interest for Iran. Regime forces began to evacuate large portions of adjacent districts in July 2015 in a move likely intended to facilitate access to the area for foreign forces. Russia has ensured the preservation of the regime through its military intervention in Syria in order to maintain and expand its own strategic foothold in the Middle East. The defense ministers of Russia and Syria confirmed that the two countries intend to further intensify their military cooperation during a meeting in Moscow on January 28.
 
See: "Russian Airstrikes in Syria: January 20 - 25, 2016," by Jodi Brignola and Genevieve Casagrande, January 26, 2016; "Russia Security Update: January 12 - 26, 2016," by Hugo Spaulding, January 26, 2016; "S-400 Missile Radius Map," by Daniel Urchick, December 21, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Russia and Ukraine analyst Hugo Spaulding or Syria analyst Chris Kozak here.
SyriaSYRIA
By: Genevieve Casagrande

Third round of Geneva talks remain unlikely to bring about meaningful progress on the Syrian Civil War. UN Special Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura met with a regime delegation on January 29 in the openingphaseof newUN-sponsored negotiations to end the Syrian Civil War. Meanwhile, the Saudi-backed opposition High Negotiating Committee (HNC) decided to send a small delegation to meet with UN officials following threats to boycott the talks until the implementation of a ceasefire and other confidence-building measures. The HNC will discuss prior UN Security Council resolutions on humanitarian issues with De Mistura but will not directly participate in negotiations with the regime. The process had been delayed from its scheduled start date on January 25 due to disagreements over the composition of the opposition delegation to the talks and the exclusion of the Syrian Kurds. Outside pressure to participate in a negotiated settlement risks driving further fragmentation within the opposition. One U.S.-backed opposition group that receives TOW anti-tank missiles withdrew from the HNC and announced its refusal to participate in the current political process while the regime and its allies continue to conduct indiscriminate attacks against civilians. Prominent Salafi-Jihadi group Ahrar al-Sham also reaffirmed its rejection of the ongoing negotiations on January 25 following uncertainty over the group's participation in the HNC. The lack of participation from prominent armed opposition groups as well as continued disagreement over preconditions for negotiations will likely render the current talks ineffective.
 
See: "Russian Airstrikes in Syria: January 20 - 25, 2016," by Jodi Brignola and Genevieve Casagrande, January 26, 2016; "UN Push for Ceasefires in Syria Achieves Results but Empowers Regime," by Jennifer Cafarella, Katie Menoche, Genevieve Casagrande, and the ISW Syria Team, December 31, 2015; "The Military Situation in Syria's Aleppo Province," by Jennifer Cafarella, Genevieve Casagrande, and Jodi Brignola, December 30, 2015; "The Syrian Opposition's Political Demands," by Genevieve Casagrande with Jennifer Cafarella, December 29, 2015; "Control of Terrain in Syria: December 23, 2015". Direct press or briefing requests for Syria analysts Jennifer Cafarella or Chris Kozak here.

IraqIRAQ
By: Emily Anagnostos and Rachel Bessette

The Iraqi Council of Representatives' security and defense committee introduced a draft conscription law on January 28. The draft law is meant to increase the size of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) even as the Iraqi government regains terrain from ISIS. Iraq has relied upon a volunteer force since the U.S. rebuilt the ISF. The conscription law also has significant political ramifications, as both Sunni and Shi'a politicians see the measure as a potential alternative to the National Guard Law that stalled in November 2015. Iraq must expand and diversify its security forces in order to clear-and-hold terrain from ISIS over the long-term.  Ongoing operations in Ramadi have demonstrated that the ISF can recapture urban terrain from ISIS with the support of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition. The Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) successfully cleared most of downtown Ramadi with the aid of the Iraqi Army (IA), tribal fighters, and local police as well as expanded training and assistance from the coalition. The operation nevertheless underscores the full scope of future operations to recapture and secure Mosul and other ISIS-held terrain. The ISF deployed six battalions of Anbar Emergency Police to Ramadi to secure recaptured areas on January 26, bolstering the three Iraqi Army (IA) divisions and local tribal fighters already present. Ramadi nonetheless remains not yet fully cleared as the ISF continue to push into Ramadi's eastern suburbs and encounter resistance from ISIS pockets using civilians as human shields. The lengthy process to recapture Ramadi underscores that an operation to clear and hold Mosul - a city that Operation Inherent Resolve spokesperson Col. Steve Warren described as "three times" the size of Ramadi - will not occur quickly. Even if the draft law passes, Iraq will require an increased amount of military and financial support from the coalition in order to simultaneously recapture territory from ISIS, alleviate the crippling economic situation, and provide essential political support for Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi. 
 
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) runs out of money as President Masoud Barzani mulls independence.Mass unemployment, a 400 billion dinar deficit, falling oil prices, and late salary payments have fueled a 400 billion dinar deficit in Iraqi Kurdistan and stroked popular dissatisfaction. The KRG will remain unable to pay Peshmerga fighters and other employees absent any improvement in their financial situation. The financial shortfall has drawn together many of Iraqi Kurdistan's political parties - including President Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) - in a bid to resolve ongoing disagreements over Barzani's expired presidential term and reopen discussions with Baghdad on improved relations. The KDP has nonetheless recently adopted rhetoric hinting at a referendum for independence in a course of action that would be opposed by Baghdad, Turkey, and the U.S. International financial assistance will be necessary to prevent the economic situation in Arbil from worsening. The KRG urgently requires this support in order to stave off mass unrest and further destabilization from popular demonstrations. Frustration with the KRG culminated in a mass strike by thousands of teachers in Suleimaniyah and Halabja Provinces of Iraqi Kurdistan on January 30. A previous mass teacher protest led to political violence that resulted in the expulsion of the main opposition party Gorran from the government in October 2015. The current political instability in Iraqi Kurdistan highlights the need for the U.S. and its allies to provide the KRG with rapid support to stave off a further deterioration of a key anti-ISIS ally while using this leverage to prevent the fracturing of Iraq. 
 
Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi faces pressure from both Najaf and Vice President Nouri al-Maliki amidst an oil-driven financial crisis. The representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called for the use of international experts to address the financial crisis in Iraq as well as austerity measures that would not affect the general populace or forces fighting against ISIS. Demonstrators gathered in Southern Iraq and Baghdad in order to demand the implementation of anti-corruption and economic reforms. In Najaf, one demonstration leader called for people to resort to violence in the event that the government fails to respond to anti-corruption demands. Popular demonstrations have continued in Baghdad and Southern Iraq since late August 2015. The sustained anger of popular demonstrations against poor provincial government performance and the weak economy underscore the rising frustration that many Iraqis have with Baghdad. PM Abadi continues to have the tepid support of Najaf and civil demonstrators, but he lacks the capacity to undertake necessary reforms to address rampant corruption. Iraq remains one of the top ten most corrupt countries in the world, according to the latest Transparency International's corruption index released on January 27. Meanwhile, Vice President Nouri al-Maliki continues to position for an eventual return to power. Maliki met with his longtime ally Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council head Medhat Mahmoud on January 28. Medhat has previously helped Maliki to construct legal challenges that consolidate his power, exemplified by the ruling that granted Maliki the premiership after the 2010 parliamentary elections. The meeting also included the Governor of Basra, a member of the rival Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), as well as the provincial council chairman. Maliki's State of Law Alliance tried to unseat the governor in late 2015 before ISCI successfully blocked the attempt. The meeting suggests that Maliki is moving to strengthen his position within Basra Province, a militia stronghold and key oil-producing region. 
 
See: "Iraq Situation Report: January 20 - 25, 2016"; "Iraqi Security Forces Clear Ramadi's Government Center," by Patrick Martin, December 28, 2015; "Control Map of Ramadi: December 22, 2015," by Patrick Martin, December 22, 2015; "Iraq Control of Terrain Map: November 25, 2015". Direct press or briefing requests for Iraq expert Patrick Martin or ISIS expert Harleen Gambhir here.

ISISISIS
By: Harleen Gambhir

ISIS confirmed that its safe havens in Iraq and Syria are the foundations for attack nodes that threaten the West. Nine members of the November 13 Paris attack cell appeared in an ISIS video previously conducting military activity in Iraq and Syria, clearly establishing that ISIS directed, trained, and resourced the attack cell from its safe haven. Eliminating ISIS's control of terrain in Iraq and Syria is vital to mitigating the threat it poses to the West. The European Union's main law enforcement agency Europol published a report on January 18 assessing that ISIS maintains the capability to conduct "special forces style attacks" in Europe, in part due to its ability to recruit and subsequently deploy foreign fighters. ISIS likely intends to launch additional Paris-style attacks against the West, and recently threatened the United Kingdom in the January 23 video. ISIS also continues to inspire individuals in the West, such as a Florida man arrested on January 23 who planned to attack his workplace after watching ISIS videos. 

ISIS's safe haven in Libya has prompted Western consideration of military intervention. President Obama has "directed his national security team to continue efforts to strengthen governance and support ongoing counterterrorism efforts in Libya and other countries where ISIL has sought to establish a presence," according to a White House statement on January 28. ISIS's Libyan affiliate continues to gain funding and foreign fighters giving ISIS strategic resiliency and raising requirements to fully defeat the organization. ISIS reportedly seized 50 million Libyan dinars, approximately $35 million, from banks in the ISIS-held city of Sirte, demonstrating how ISIS's territorial control is sustaining the organization in Libya as it has in Iraq and Syria. ISIS continues to exploit Libya's unstable political situation and will likely also make efforts to increase disorder in neighboring countries using Libya as a base. 

ISIS is exploiting continued disorder in Tunisia and Yemen. The Tunisian government reestablished order this week after widespread protests, but the harshness of the crackdown reduced public confidence in the unstable government. There are several reasons for Tunisia's current destabilization, including widespread mistrust of the government's ability to ensure security and economic stability. ISIS is able to leverage this mistrust by carrying out attacks that target the tourism industry and impact public perceptions of safety, as Tunisians trained in Libya have already done in 2015 with two attacks against tourist sites. ISIS will likely continue to create disorder with attacks that take advantage of existing vulnerabilities in Tunisia. This effort is part of ISIS's larger trans-regional campaign to foment chaos in order to facilitate its eventual expansion beyond Iraq and Syria. ISIS also seeks to encourage continued conflict in war-torn Yemen, where it launched an attack on the Aden Presidential Palace on January 28. The Palace is the de facto seat of Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi's government. Continued assassinations by ISIS and other Islamist groups will accelerate destabilization and constrain the ability of the Saudi-led Arab coalition to resolve the conflict in Yemen. ISIS also continues to put pressure on a domestically tense Saudi Arabia with attacks against Shi'a sites, including an (as yet unclaimed) complex attack on a mosque in al-Ahsa on January 29.      

ISIS is using its safe havens in Iraq and Syria to consolidate support in South and Southeast Asia. ISIS likely intends to expand its regional campaign to Southeast Asia and is shaping the area for further operations. Southeast Asia is home to several fragmented militant groups that previously comprised the AQ-associated Jemaah Islamiyyah group, which has presence in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, southern Thailand, and southern Philippines. ISIS is bringing together these fragmented elements by providing them with funding, weapons, and attack instructions. Indonesian officials reported this week that a local militant group received funding from ISIS in Syria. The officials also claimed that the January 14 ISIS-claimed Jakarta attack involved weapons smuggled between the Philippines and Indonesia, indicating coordination between two jihadist groups in support of an ISIS-linked attack. ISIS is also using its foreign fighter population within Iraq and Syria to encourage and direct attacks in Southeast Asia. Malaysian authorities arrested an attack-planning cell on January 22 that reportedly received instructions from both the Indonesian planner of the Jakarta attack and a Malaysian foreign fighter in Syria. Indian authorities also arrested several ISIS suspects throughout the country to forestall possible attacks on January 26 Republic Day celebrations. The suspects reportedly had links to an India-based ISIS-linked group that had recruited individuals and helped them travel to join ISIS in Syria. ISIS will continue to use its South and Southeast Asian foreign fighter population to recruit others, as well as to strengthen ties to and between pro-ISIS jihadi groups in the area. 

This section draws upon sourcing and analysis provided by our partners at the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute.
 
See: "ISIS's Regional Campaign: December 2015," by Harleen Gambhir, January 11, 2016; "ISIS Sanctuary: December 21, 2015"; "Meet ISIL's Most Dangerous Affiliates," by Harleen Gambhir, Politico, December 14, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Counter-Terrorism analyst and ISIS expert Harleen Gambhir here.   

AfghanistanAfghanistan 
by: Caitlin Forrest

Taliban militants gained strength in southern Helmand and Kandahar Provinces, further pressuring weakened government security structures. Taliban militants are closing ranks and attempting to gain new resource streams as local Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) face leadership and re-structuring issues. Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour gained support from a formerly dissident senior Taliban leader in Kandahar on January 26, demonstrating increased ability to consolidate power amidst continued military gains. The Taliban attacked the Afghan Border Police Headquarters in Spin Boldak District, Kandahar Province on January 25, likely aiming to threaten the security apparatus of Kandahar Police Chief General Abdul Raziq, originally based in Spin Boldak, who is known for his successful anti-Taliban operations in Kandahar Province. Spin Boldak is also an illegal resource hub which could give Taliban militants access to smuggling hubs and new resources and revenue.  Government security forces also face significant pressure in Helmand Province. The 215th ANSF Maiwand Corps in Helmand is reportedly facing major restructuring and leadership challenges due to the ANSF's inability to secure Helmand Province from Taliban militants. Taliban militants continue to attack Gereshk District, Helmand Province following clearing operations in neighboring Maiwand District, Kandahar Province. A diminished U.S. presence is also undermining the ANSF's command and control capabilities in the area. This comes as the U.S. Department of Defense nominated Lt. Gen. John Nicholson to replace Gen. John Campbell as the commander of Operation Resolute Support. In his Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on January 28, Nicholson acknowledged the security situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating and stressed the need to prevent Kandahar from falling to Taliban militants. The simultaneous consolidation and strengthening of the Taliban movement in southern Afghanistan alongside the weakening of Afghan security structures indicate that government forces face high risk of collapse in the area. 

ISIS-linked militants increased activity south of Kabul, presenting a new threat to the capital city. ISIS's Wilayat Khorasan reportedly has significant presence outside of its stronghold in Nangarhar Province, eastern Afghanistan. Wilayat Khorasan has maintained a leadership component in Azrah District, Logar Province since its creation in January 2015, and may be increasing activity in the area to exploit heightened insecurity. NDS agents raided three Wilayat Khorasan weapons caches in Azrah District on January 25, following reports of significant ISIS militant presence in Zanakhan District, Ghazni Province and Kherwar District, Logar Province on January 21. Taliban, Haqqani, and other militants have historically had significant presence in Zanakhan and Kherwar Districts and other areas south of Kabul. Some pre-existing militant groups may be switching loyalties to ISIS in those areas. Wilayat Khorasan claimed two IED attacks in Kabul City against police and border police chiefs on January 28, although no independent sources confirmed the blasts. Wilayat Khorasan also released a "Cubs of the Caliphate" video featuring a militant training camp for children in an unspecified location on January 28. The video highlights Wilayat Khorasan's intent to replicate ISIS's overall military control and social indoctrination methods in Afghanistan. 

Northern powerbrokers are distancing themselves from the National Unity Government as political opposition groups gain momentum. The National Unity Government is facing increasing resistance from political opposition groups like the Afghanistan Protection and Security Council (APSC) and warlords.Former Northern Alliance member and First Vice President General Abdul Rashid Dostum did not attend the recent National Security Council meeting on January 26 after openly criticizing the government on January 13, and reports indicate he is holding meetings with top security officials in his home.  Dostum, who has a history of switching loyalties, might ultimately leave the unity government to side with new political opposition groups emerging backed by former Northern Alliance powerbrokers.  The APSC, led by another former Northern Alliance powerbroker Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, held a large rally criticizing the government in Kabul city on January 22 in an effort to muster popular support for the party. Other speakers included Senator Mawlawi Abdul Wahab Erfan, member of the Tajik-dominated Jamiat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (JIA) party made up of former Northern Alliance members, and  Sayyaf's son, Habib ul-Rahman Sayyaf, who leads the Islamic Youth of the Dawwah Organization of Afghanistan (YIDOA). Warlord Muhammed Ismail Khan, an APSC and JIA member, continued to undermine the unity government's legitimacy with his loyal Afghan militias in western Afghanistan. Northern powerbrokers distancing themselves from the unity government may ultimately lead to collapse of the unity government. 

See: "Afghanistan Threat Assessment: The Taliban and  ISIS," by Jessica Lewis McFate, Rob Denaburg, and Caitlin Forrest, December 11, 2015; "ISIS in Afghanistan," by Harleen Gambhir, December 3, 2015The Taliban Resurgent: Threats to Afghanistan's Security, by Lauren McNally and Paul Bucala, March 20, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests on Afghanistan here.
 
By: Hugo Spaulding
 
Deterring Russian aggression is the top U.S. military priority in Europe in EUCOM's new theater strategyreleased on January 26. U.S. European Command (EUCOM) pledged to build the defensive capabilities of Eastern European NATO members and non-NATO partners facing the threat of Russia revanchism. EUCOM argued that rotating U.S. troops into Europe was an insufficient substitute for an "enduring forward deployed presence" and limited the U.S.'s ability to contribute to regional security. The U.S. has roughly halved force levels forward deployed in Europe since 2004, leaving approximately 65,000 in theater in 2015. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced that "new investments" to bolster European security were included in his fiscal year 2017 defense budget request. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg meanwhile called for the establishment of a "cooperative and constructive" relationship with Russia in his newly released 2015 annual report and revealed that NATO may soon hold its first formal talks with Russia since June 2014. He also announced plans to increase its presence in Poland after the July alliance summit in Warsaw and revealed that defense spending cuts among NATO allies in Europe had "practically stopped" in 2015. Poland announced plans to station the first three brigades of its new national guard on its border with Russia's Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad, the site of the westernmost Russian military base. The Polish defense minister also hosted his Lithuanian and Ukrainian counterparts to discuss the anticipated launch of a joint brigade in January 2017, a formation that will increase the interoperability of Ukraine's forces with the transatlantic alliance. Secretary General Stoltenberg stressed that the alliance's efforts to strengthen its defenses while re-engaging Russia did not present a "contradiction" and instead fostered "mutual respect." Moscow's envoy to NATO nevertheless accused the alliance of creating a new "iron curtain" by strengthening its defenses in Eastern Europe and promised Russian retaliation against efforts to upset the regional "military equilibrium." 
 
Russia escalated its force projection efforts against NATO's southern and eastern flanks. Turkey accused Russia's air contingent in Syria of violating its airspace for the first time since a Turkish jet downed a Russian warplane near its border with Syria in November. The reported January 29 incursion into the southern Turkish province of Gaziantep by a Russian Su-34 fighter-bomber marks a new escalation in Russia's aggressive confrontation with Turkey. Russia's previous violations of Turkish airspace, deployment of long-range missile systems to Syria, and sanctions against Turkey demonstrate its intent to expand its freedom of action along NATO's southern flank. Moscow's tandem antagonization of Ankara and courting of Western partners against ISIS also deliberately strains existing regional divisions within NATO. Russia aggressively confronted the U.S. in the region this week, dangerously intercepting a U.S. reconnaissance plane in international airspace over the Black Sea on January 25. It announced plans to deploy additional air superiority fighter aircraft to the occupied Crimean Peninsula and create three new divisions in its western regions in 2016 in response to an "increase in the intensity of exercises" by NATO members. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared on January 26 that the Kremlin was prepared for "constructive cooperation" with the U.S. and Europe "exclusively on an equal and mutually advantageous basis" while criticizing alleged Western efforts to "contain" Russia. Lavrov's statement reflects Russia's wider efforts to assert itself as a great power rival to the U.S. through confrontational military and diplomatic posturing.
 
See: "Russia Security Update: January 12 - 26, 2016," by Hugo Spaulding, January 26, 2016;"Russian-Backed Separatists Seize Village Near Mariupol," by Franklin Holcomb, January 14, 2016; "Ukraine Crisis Update: December 14, 2015," by Hugo Spaulding, December 14, 2015; Putin's Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia's Hybrid Warfareby Maria Snegovaya, September 21, 2015Direct press or briefing requests for Russia and Ukraine analyst Hugo Spaulding here.

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