|  |  ISW Intelligence Summary: September 18-25, 2015 |
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|  ISW INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY: September 18-25, 2015 Reviewing the Week Compiled by Harleen Gambhir with Daniel Pitcairn This report is derived from open sources collected and processed at ISW during the reporting period. The report includes analysis on Russia in the Middle East, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, ISIS, Afghanistan, and Ukraine. * Links may not work on mobile devices or some email platforms.
Key Take-Away
Russia in the Middle East Russian President Vladimir Putin is racing to build an alternate anti-ISIS coalition that includes Iran and the Syrian regime ahead of his speech at the UN General Assembly on September 28. This alliance is manifesting on the ground, as Russia is constructing two new military facilities and deploying ground-attack aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems in northeastern Syria, while reportedly creating a military coordination cell with Syrian, Iranian, and Iraqi Shi'a militia commanders in Baghdad. This geopolitical maneuvering will undercut the role of the U.S. in the Middle East, while deflecting attention away from Russia's strategic adventurism in Eastern Europe and Ukraine. Russia has also begun construction of two large military bases near its border with Kiev-controlled northeastern Ukraine and is likely to reach an agreement to establish an airbase in Belarus. Russia is alternating military activity in Syria and Ukraine while creating long-term capacity that will enable it to project force and achieve its political goals on its own timeline. Russia's escalation in the Middle East has triggered diplomatic and political reshuffling that will challenge the U.S.'s desired outcomes across the region. Russia has reportedly demanded that the U.S. coordinate its international counter-ISIS campaign with Russia, Syria, and Iran. U.S. President Barack Obama agreed to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in their first formal face-to-face talks in over a year, marking the degree to which Russia has forced its way to the top of the international agenda amidst accelerating Russian military involvement in Syria and Iraq. Putin met with both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Turkish President Recep Erdogan this week, indicating that neither will immediately challenge Russian presence in Syria through military means. Leaders in Western Europe and Turkey softened their rhetoric regarding Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's role in a political settlement of the Syrian Civil War, prompted by the Russian military presence, the ongoing refugee crisis, and in the case of Turkey a desire to advance talks for a natural gas pipeline. Putin's anti-ISIS strategy thwarts the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition. Russia's backing of Assad undercuts the Syrian opposition writ large, not just ISIS. Russia's mobilization in Syria may also neutralize Turkey as an effective anti-ISIS actor and will likely undermine the implementation of the U.S.-Turkey "ISIS-free zone." The net result will be a two-way geopolitical loss for the U.S., both to Russia and to ISIS, without the hope that their violent engagement in Syria will mitigate the threat that either poses to the West.
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IRAQ Unconfirmed Russian presence in Baghdad: An unconfirmed report stated that a joint Russian and Iranian "coordination cell" had been established in Baghdad that included "low-level Russian generals," a development of which Iraqi Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari stated that he had "no knowledge." ISW will watch for additional indicators to verify this report and identify the size and nature of the Russian presence, should it exist. Debate over U.S. role in Iraq: General David Petraeus testified that the U.S. needs to provide greater support to the ISF, anti-ISIS Iraqi Sunni tribal fighters, and the Peshmerga during a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 22. In particular, General Petraeus recommended deploying joint tactical air controllers and embedding U.S. advisers with the ISF at the brigade headquarters level. Within Iraq, Iranian proxy militias responded to unsubstantiated rumors by Anbar province officials and anonymous sources that U.S. advisers had taken an increased role in operations to recapture Ramadi, including the provision of Apache helicopters, which Anbar's governor denied. Qais Khazali, the leader of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, an Iranian-backed group, condemned U.S. "conspiracies" to keep the "Popular Mobilization" out of Anbar operations and rejected the purported presence of U.S. combat troops. Proxy militias likely will attempt to prevent any expansion of the role of U.S forces, including by using lethal force against U.S. forces or against the ISF. ISIS pressures the ISF near Baiji and Baghdad: ISIS continues to place significant pressure on the ISF as the Iraqi government struggles to make progress on the political front. ISIS launched two SVBIED attacks on ISF positions at the Baiji oil refinery north of Tikrit on September 19, causing a large fire within the refinery. On the same day, the ISF interdicted two SVEST attackers in western Baghdad. ISIS also detonated a VBIED in eastern Baghdad on September 21, demonstrating that ISIS maintains lethal capabilities in various parts of Baghdad despite the heavy presence of security forces. In addition, the ISF launched a clearing operation against ISIS in the Thar Thar area, northwest of Baghdad, an area that Federal Police and the "Popular Mobilization" ostensibly cleared in late May and June of 2015. The ISF and "Popular Mobilization" have been unsuccessful in restricting ISIS freedom of movement in this zone.
Iraqi government under political pressure: Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi's reform efforts appear to have stalled, with no noticeable progress made since he dismissed 123 senior ministerial officials on September 10. The Iraqi parliament held its last session on September 16 but has recessed for the Eid al-Adha holiday. Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi'a militias have resisted PM Abadi's reform program and teamed with PM Abadi's political rivals within the Shi'a political scene, particularly VP Nouri al-Maliki, to prevent additional reforms from passing. Qais al-Khazali, leader of the proxy militia Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), dismissed popular demonstrations as "moribund" and having reached their final stages, blaming the government for not having dealt with them appropriately. Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq suspended its affiliates participating in the popular demonstrations that began on July 31. Proxy militias no longer see either any benefit to participating in the demonstrations or any ability to influence the movement from within, and are more likely to attempt to suppress the movement through violence rather than harness it against PM Abadi. Provincial governments resisted demands by ongoing popular demonstrations to conduct major reforms, initiating only nominal reshuffling within provincial governments without diminishing political parties' influence or increasing their accountability to Iraqi citizens. Meanwhile, Turkey continued to conduct airstrikes against the PKK in northern Iraq.
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SYRIA
Turkey and Israel respond to Russian buildup: Regional powers active in the Syrian Civil War were forced to react to new realities on the ground as Russia continued its military buildup along the Syrian Coast. Most recently, Russia delivered at least 24 ground attack aircraft and several surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems to an airfield in Latakia Province on September 20 and commenced Russian surveillance drone and manned flights from its base there, reportedly ahead of a possible air campaign. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on September 21 and agreed to establish a joint coordination team headed by the deputy chiefs of the two countries' armed forces in order to avoid confrontation between their aerial, naval, and electromagnetic operations in Syria. Two days later, Turkish President Recep Erdogan met with President Putin in Moscow and agreed to form a foreign minister working group on the Syrian Civil War. President Erdogan later stated that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad could take part in a transition process in Syria, marking a significant change in Turkish rhetoric that is likely linked to mounting Russian military pressure and recent talks over the delayed Turkish Stream natural gas pipeline between Russia and Turkey. International actors soften stance on President Assad: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry reaffirmed that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad "has to go" in a statement on September 19. In contrast, prominent European countries continued to soften their position on the role of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in any political settlement to end the Syrian Civil War. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius stressed on September 21 that France will not demand the departure of President Assad as a precondition to peace talks, and, three days later, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that negotiations should include President Assad as well as other regional players. These comments follow similar statements by the foreign ministers of Austria, Britain, and Spain in recent weeks and likely stem from a mounting refugee crisis in Europe driven in large part by the Syrian Civil War. Russia will likely attempt to leverage these statements in order to legitimize its calls for a new international anti-ISIS coalition that includes Russia, Iran, and the Syrian regime during talks at the upcoming UN General Assembly. The proposal will likely constitute a key agenda item during a meeting between President Putin and U.S. President Barack Obama on the sidelines of the General Assembly, which would represent their first face-to-face talks in over a year. U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition in Syria faces new challenges: The insertion of a second batch of seventy-five U.S.-trained rebel fighters into northern Syria was marred by allegations that some members of the group defected or turned their weapons over to Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). The U.S. Department of Defense rejected the defection claims as part of an active JN disinformation campaign to discredit the U.S. train-and-equip program, but the rumors will likely further erode confidence in the U.S.-led anti-ISIS campaign within Congress, the American public, and the international community. On the ground, ISIS continued to position itself to seize additional territory in eastern and western Syria. ISIS deployed a large number of reinforcements to Deir ez-Zour City from western Anbar Province in Iraq in alleged preparation for a major offensive against regime-held portions of the city, which may be an effort to prevent Russian build up in the area. ISIS also claimed to seize parts of the highway between Homs City and the strategic T4 (Tiyas) Airbase in eastern Homs Province after a sharp intensification of IED and VBIED attacks in Homs City that have been claimed by both ISIS and JN.
See: "New Russian Activity in Syria: Istamo Weapon Storage Facility SE of Latakia," by ISW and AllSource Analysis, September 24, 2015; "Russian Deployments at Al-Assad Airport in Syria," by ISW and AllSource Analysis, September 24, 2015; "Forecasting the Syrian Civil War," by Christopher Kozak, Jennifer Cafarella, and the ISW Syria Team, September 17, 2015; "Russian Deployment in Syria: Putin's Middle East Game Changer," by Hugo Spaulding, Christopher Kozak, Christopher Harmer, Daniel Urchick, Jessica Lewis-McFate, Jennifer Cafarella, Harleen Gambhir, and Kimberly Kagan, September 17, 2015; "Posture of Syrian Regime and Allies: September 14, 2015," by ISW Syria Team, September 14, 2015; "Military Situation on the Syrian-Turkish Border: September 14, 2015," by ISW Syria Team, September 14, 2015; "Control of Terrain in Syria: September 14, 2015"; "An Army in All Corners:" Assad's Campaign Strategy in Syria, by Christopher Kozak, April 30, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Syria analysts Jennifer Cafarella or Chris Kozak here.
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EGYPT Egypt reacts to international scrutiny: The Egyptian government tried to abate mounting criticism of its counterterrorism practices in the wake of the accidental killing of eight Mexican tourists by the Egyptian military on September 13. A Human Rights Watch report issued on September 21 condemned Egypt's displacement without compensation of thousands of residents in North Sinai over two years of counterterrorism operations. In response Egypt's Cabinet of Ministers claimed residents had received compensation, and on September 23, the Egyptian military pledged to focus on improving the welfare of Sinai residents. Meanwhile, ISIS affiliate Wilayat Sinai likely is capitalizing on resentment against the Egyptian military to foster ties with local residents. On September 23, Wilayat Sinai released photos of militants distributing food aid to "areas besieged by the Egyptian military." ISIS also released a separate statement claiming the Egyptian military was responsible for a September 14 small arms attack on a wedding in Khareeza, Central Sinai. New government, same corruption accusations: Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi swore in new Prime Minister Sherif Ismail and sixteen new ministers on September 19. However, private media sources and online rumors have accused Sherif Ismail of corruption and implicated him in the same bribery scandal that lead to the resignation of Egypt's previous prime minister and cabinet on September 12. The sources of the rumors are supportive of el-Sisi, however, suggesting that the President may already be planning another corruption probe. See: "ISIS's Wilayat Sinai Launches Largest Offensive in Sheikh Zuweid," by Yasmin Faruki, Jenna Gowell, and Laura Hoffman, July 1, 2015; "ISIS's Wilayat Sinai Attacks International Base," by Harleen Gambhir and Jantzen Garnett, June 13, 2015; "Wilayat Sinai Likely Preparing for Car Bomb Campaign," by Jantzen Garnett and Aaron Reese, March 12, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests on Egypt here |
ISIS Changes to U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition: Russia's moves to fundamentally redefine the international fight against ISIS on its own terms come as the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition faces significant challenges. U.S. Special Envoy to the anti-ISIS Coalition Gen. John Allen (Ret.) will reportedly resign from his position by early November.
ISIS responds to Russian presence: ISIS reportedly deployed forces from al-Qaim in western Iraq to eastern Syria on September 22, likely in response to a perceived confluence of new threats from the Russian-Syrian regime alliance and the U.S.-led coalition in Syria. ISIS likely intends to consolidate its control of Deir ez-Zour and may increase operations in western Syria in order to forestall Russian and Syrian escalation in the east. ISIS will also likely reinforce its stronghold in ar-Raqqa, while planning for its potential loss, as White House and Pentagon officials are reportedly considering a proposal to supply Syrian Arab and Kurdish forces to advance against the city. ISIS may also increase cooperation with al-Qaeda's (AQ) Syrian affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in some parts of Syria to attack the regime. Additionally, ISIS may intensify elements of its Near Abroad campaign in response to Russia's escalation. ISIS's governorate in Russia's North Caucasus region, Wilayat Qawqaz, released its first promotional video on September 23 and will likely use Russia's anti-ISIS operations in Syria as grounds for recruitment in both countries. AQ's leader Ayman al-Zawahiri recently reiterated his willingness to cooperate with ISIS in such attacks despite his condemnation of ISIS's caliphate.
Military and social expansion in ISIS's Near Abroad: Several of ISIS's regional affiliates broadened their military operations and social outreach this week. ISIS claimed its first attack in Giza, Egypt on September 20, likely reflecting growing recruitment by ISIS in Egypt's mainland. ISIS's affiliate in the Sinai Peninsula, Wilayat Sinai, also increased its outreach to local tribes, distributing food and blaming civilian casualties on the Egyptian government. ISIS's affiliates in Libya renewed attacks in major cities east and west of the ISIS-controlled city of Sirte, where the group has established checkpoints and begun burning contraband as an expression of social control. ISIS also continued its campaign of spectacular attacks against al Houthi forces in Yemen while publicizing the medical training it gives its fighters. Afghan security forces claimed to have cleared Kot in eastern Nangarhar province, the first district ISIS seized in Afghanistan. The claim is unconfirmed, however, and clashes between the two sides are likely ongoing. Groups affiliated with ISIS in Afghanistan continue to call for warring factions of the Taliban to join ISIS, an appeal that may resonate if ISIS defeats the Afghan government in Nangarhar.
Pro-ISIS presence in Asia and Europe: Indications of growing support for ISIS in Southeast Asia emerged this week as Indonesia's counterterrorism chief claimed that foreign fighters are traveling to the country to train in pro-ISIS military camps. Meanwhile, large-scale raids in Berlin, Germany on September 22 underscored ISIS's continued recruitment in Europe. ISIS may use these networks to capitalize on cultural tensions raised by the European refugee crisis. ISIS is currently attempting to seize the crisis as an opportunity to convince refugees to travel to its "caliphate" instead.
See: "ISIS's Global Strategy: September 2015," by Harleen Gambhir, September 18, 2015; "ISIS Sanctuary Map: September 15, 2015"; ISIS's Global Strategy: A Wargame, by Harleen Gambhir, July 15, 2015; The ISIS Defense in Iraq and Syria: Countering an Adaptive Enemy,by Jessica Lewis McFate, May 15, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Counter-Terrorism analyst Harleen Gambhir or ISIS expert Jessica Lewis McFate here.
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Afghanistan
Future NATO presence: On September 25 NATO General and U.S. commander General John Campbell sent five distinct recommendations to the Pentagon and NATO officials on the future of the U.S. and NATO mission in Afghanistan. Current plans would withdraw most of the 10,000 remaining U.S. troops by the end of 2016. General Campbell's proposed options include maintaining current force levels, reducing to interim figures such as 8,000 or 5,000, or continuing the existing withdrawal plan that would leave several hundred troops by the end of 2016. The recommendations each came with a risk assessment, as with all professional military options. Taliban fractures into three rival groups: This week the Taliban split into three distinct groups headed by rival commanders, in the insurgency's largest fracture since the July 29 announcement of Mullah Omar's death in late 2013. Mullah Akhtar Mansour enjoys support from the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Mullah Omar's son and brother, and al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. His faction reportedly has the support of the largest portion of Taliban commanders. Several prominent and powerful hardliners from the southern Pashtun areas head the newest and next strongest faction, announced on September 19. This group opposes any negotiation with the Afghan government and includes Mullah Abdul Manan Niazi (former Taliban governor of Balkh and Herat), Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir (former Guantanamo Bay detainee), Mullah Mohammad Hassan Rahmani (former Taliban governor of Kandahar), and Mullah Mohammad Rasul (former governor of Nimruz). The faction stated its intent on September 22 to form a council of religious clerics to choose a rival leader to Mansour. Mullah Mansoor Dadullah leads the third faction, Zabul-based splinter group Fidai Mahaz, which has openly clashed with pro-Mansour forces and is rumored to receive support from ISIS. The fracture of the Taliban likely will lead to increased attacks against the Afghan government as the three factions compete to prove their power and worthiness as leaders of the Jihad. Taliban Deh Yak offensive: Elements of the Taliban are preparing for an offensive in Deh Yak district, Ghazni province. The district is operationally important for the Taliban because it offers connections with militants in Paktika province and a route into Logar and Kabul province. The Taliban began preparations on September 20 by warning villagers to evacuate. It also began constructing road blockades to isolate the area and is planting roadside IEDs targeting Afghan Local Police convoys and outposts throughout the district. These tactics are consistent with previous Taliban efforts to isolate and consolidate control of rural district areas before assaulting a district center.
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Ukraine Russian buildup in Syria supported from Crimea: Russia accelerated efforts to secure a strategic foothold in the Middle East and on the Mediterranean with the deployment of surveillance drones and 24 new fighter jets to the Syrian coast, where new satellite imagery has shown Russia is developing two military facilities in addition to the al-Assad International Airport in Latakia. On September 24, Russia's defense ministry announced naval drills in the eastern Mediterranean involving the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva guided missile cruiser, as well as the Saratov, the landing ship ISW's partner AllSource Analysis may have observed in the midst of loading operations in Sevastopol, Crimea on September 20. While the defense ministry claimed that the exercise was planned in 2014, Russia is likely using the drills to disguise further deployments to the Syrian coast. The Syrian regime reportedly began deploying newly-delivered Russian surveillance drones, while Russian President Vladimir Putin allegedly is considering launching airstrikes against ISIS with or without U.S. approval. Such strikes may precede or follow Putin's September 28 speech at the UN General Assembly, where he will likely meet with President Barack Obama, scoring a victory in Russia's efforts to legitimize its proposal for an alternative anti-ISIS coalition that involves Russia and the Assad regime. Russia counterbalances in Europe: Russia's new military force projection and counterbalancing efforts against the United States and its allies extends beyond the Middle East. Putin issued a decree on September 19 calling on the Russian defense and foreign ministries to reach an agreement with Belarus on the establishment of a Russian airbase on Belarusian soil. Russia's influence over Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, comparable to the control it held over ousted Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, makes this agreement likely. A Russian airbase in Belarus would allow the Kremlin to project military force against Kyiv, as well as Poland and the Baltics, while solidifying Russia's influence over its westernmost ally. New reports suggest that Russia is also constructing two large military bases near its border with government-controlled northeastern Ukraine. The planned bases in Belgorod and Voronezh Oblasts are thought to have the capacity for 3,500 and 5,000 soldiers, respectively, in addition to heavy weapons. Taken in conjunction with the plans for an airbase in Belarus, this construction suggests that Russia is positioning itself, in the long term, to open or at least threaten to open a second front in Ukraine from the north. Such posturing serves as further indication that Russia may not draw down its military presence in southeastern Ukraine despite a nearly month-long operational pause. See: "Ukraine Crisis Update: September 23, 2015," Putin's Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia's Hybrid Warfare, by Maria Snegovaya, September 21, 2015; "Russian Deployment in Syria: Putin's Middle East Game Changer," by Hugo Spaulding, Christopher Kozak, Christopher Harmer, Daniel Urchick, Jessica Lewis-McFate, Jennifer Cafarella, Harleen Gambhir, and Kimberly Kagan, September 17, 2015; "Far-Right Riot at Ukraine's Parliament," by Hugo Spaulding, September 1, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Ukraine analyst Hugo Spaulding here. |
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