Whose Side is Germany On, Anyway?

The Dispatch: (Photo by Jesco Denzel/Bundesregierung via Getty Images.) In a Monday morning press conference, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced that several members of the military alliance were stepping up their efforts to deter a Russian reinvasion of Ukraine. Denmark will send a frigate to the Baltic Sea and fighter jets to Lithuania. Spain is dispatching ships to the Black and Mediterranean Seas. The Netherlands is committing aircraft to Bulgaria, and France is prepared to send troops to Romania. President Joe Biden said last week the United States has already shipped $600 million worth of arms to Kyiv, and the United Kingdom has airlifted thousands of short-range antitank missiles to Ukraine in recent days, plus 30 “elite British troops” to train Ukrainians to use them. Germany—the third-largest NATO member by population—has been notably absent from this unified show of force. Citing the country’s long-standing, “very clear stance on weapons exports,” Olaf Scholz—the country’s new chancellor—told reporters late last week Germany would likely abstain from supporting Ukraine militarily. A few hours later, The Wall Street Journal reported Berlin had blocked Estonia from doing so as well, because the Cold War-era howitzers the small NATO ally had planned to supply Kyiv originated in East Germany. The British planes carrying antitank missiles to Ukraine last week took a long detour through Denmark to avoid German airspace. (Initial reports indicated Germany had denied the planes’ request to take a more direct route, but both German and UK officials later clarified the UK didn’t bother to ask permission in the first place.) Berlin’s reluctance to export weapons—or be even tangentially associated with exporting weapons—is just one sliver of Germany’s broader caginess toward the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Scholz is saying many of the right things—“Borders must not be moved by force,” a Russian invasion of Ukraine will “have a high cost”—but he has proven unwilling to publicly commit to hardline sanctions on Russia’s prized (but not-yet-operational) Nord Stream 2 pipeline in the event of an incursion. “It is clear that there will be a high cost and that all this will have to be discussed if there is a military intervention against Ukraine,” Scholz said last Tuesday when pressed on the nearly-finished natural gas pipeline, which connects Russia and Germany while bypassing Ukraine. A few weeks earlier, he described Nord Stream 2 as a “private-sector project” and sought to de-link its regulatory approval from the Ukraine situation—a position Germany’s defense minister echoed earlier this month. Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has opposed the pipeline in the past, but dodged a question on it in a joint press conference with Secretary of State Antony Blinken last week. Yesterday, she said the “hardest stick” may not always yield the best results. Why all the equivocation? Two main reasons: Germany’s increasing reliance on Russian energy, and the long and fraught history between the two countries.